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Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal
Game
Adicci´ on y autocontrol: un juego intrapersonal
Rafael L´ opez ∗
Abstract
In their model of addiction, O’Donoghue and Rabin obtain a counter-
intuitive result: a person that is fully aware of his self-control problems
(sophisticate) is more prone to become addicted than one who is fully
unaware (na¨ ıf). In this paper we show that this result arises from their
particular equilibrium selection for the induced intra-personal game.
We provide dominating Markov Perfect equilibria where the paradox
vanishes and that seem more “natural” since they capture behaviors of-
ten observed in the realm of addiction. We also address the issueof why
an unaddicted person could decide to start consuming and possibly de-
velop an addiction. In particular, we showthat their equilibrium implies
that both naifs and sophisticates will slip into addiction. In contrast, by
considering our results, only naifs will become addicted which is in ac-
cordance to the common intuition. Finally, we suggest a clear-cut way
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of modeling partial awareness of self-control problems; a topic that has
received little attention in the literature.
Key words: addiction, self-control, negative internalities, habit forma-
tion,hyperbolicdiscounting,na¨ ıvet´ e, sophistication,timeinconsistency.
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Resumen
En su modelo de adicci´ on, O’Donoghue y Rabin obtienen un resultado
contra-intuitivo: un individuo plenamente conciente de sus problemas
deautocontrol(i.e. un soﬁsticado)es m´ as propensoa caer en laadicci´ on
que un individuo que los ignora por completo (i.e. un na¨ ıf). En este
art´ ıculo se muestra que dicho resultado es una consecuencia directa de
la particular selecci´ on del equilibrio que realizan para el juego intra-
personal inducido. Nosotros proporcionamos equilibrios Perfectos de
Markov donde la paradoja desaparece y que resultan m´ as ”naturales”
pues reﬂejan comportamientos com´ unmente observados en los contex-
tos de adicci´ on. Tambi´ en se aborda la raz´ on por la cual una persona
que se inicia en el consumo de una sustancia adictiva posiblemente cae
en la adicci´ on. En particular, se muestra que bajo el equilibrio selec-
cionado por O&R tanto los na¨ ıfs como los soﬁsticados caer´ ıan en la
adicci´ on mientras que considerando nuestros equilibrios, s´ olo los na¨ ıfs
sucumbir´ ıan. El resultado est´ ac l a r a m e n t em ´ as de acuerdo con el sen-
tido com´ un. Finalmente se sugiere una forma simple de modelar la
conciencia parcial de los problemas de autocontrol, contribuyendo as´ ı
a un tema que hasta el momento ha recibido muy poca atenci´ on en la
literatura.
Palabras clave: adicci´ on, autocontrol, internalidades negativas, for-
maci´ on de h´ abito, descuento hiperb´ olico, na¨ ıvet´ e, soﬁsticaci´ on, incon-
sistencia temporal.
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Introduction
Mr. X goes to a party where he is offered a pill - call it Panacea-. He
knows for sure that if he takes it he will experience immediate pleasure
but he is also aware that some of his neuronal cells will pay for his de-
cision. Since most humans, and particularly X, use but a small fraction
of their brain capacity, he might as well give up those neuronal cells
without experiencing a signiﬁcant loss. However, he is also aware that
pill would lead to some more which altogether will produce a certain
brain clash. Should I stay or should I go? X asked to himself. As the
indecision bothered him, he evaluated whether the immediate pleasure
offset the future brain damage and proceeded accordingly.
We may not know whether X took Panacea or not, but we certainly
know that he is a rational forward-looking person: when adopting his
decision he knew the future consequences of his choice. Mr. X was
perfectly aware of the two characteristics constituting the crux of an ad-
dictive substance, namely, the habit-forming property (present pill rais-
ing future consumption); and the negative internalities induced by con-
sumption (present pill reducing future well-being, via the brain clash).
In their famous work, Becker and Murphy (1988) modeled consump-
tion of a good presenting these two features as a rational process where
addiction is understood as the outcome of intended behavior (i.e., in-
tertemporal utility maximization) under perfect foresight. In particular,
theirRational Addictionmodel impliesthat an addict does not regret his
previous decisions and perfectly forecasts his future consumption; two
elements that have largely been criticized (surveys of these critics are
found in Chaloupka and Warner 1998 and Messinis 1999). On psycho-
logical grounds, addiction certainly entails planned behavior but it also
involves self-control problems that give rise to regret and misprediction
of future conduct. This is clearly illustrated by Heyman (1996):
Drug consumption is a goal oriented act. The behaviors are
learned, not reﬂexive or innate. It requires planning, effort, and
in some cases artfulness to secure drugs in the amount necessary
for maintaining an addiction. Yet, according to the diagnostic4 4 4 4 4
Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal Game
Rafael López
manuals (e.g., DSM-III-R and ICD-10), the feature that deﬁnes
addiction is drug use which is ‘out of control’ or ‘compulsive’.
By these phrases, the manuals mean that addicts ‘take more drug
that they initially intended’, that drug use persists despite a wide
array of ensuing legal, medical, and social problems, and that
after periods of abstinence, however long, addicts relapse.
As Gruber and Koszegi (2001) point out, “The term ‘rational addiction’
obscures the fact that the Becker and Murphy model imposes two as-
sumptions on consumer behavior. The ﬁrst is that of forward-looking
decision-making, which is hard to impugn (...). The second is the as-
sumption that consumers are time consistent. Psychological evidence
documentsoverwhelminglythatconsumersare timeinconsistent”(page
16).
Recently and in different contexts, many economists have studied self-
control problems modeling them in terms of the time inconsistency de-
rived from non-exponential discounting1. Supported by empirical evi-
denceshowingthatsubjectsexhibitdecliningdiscountrates (e.g. Thaler
(1991); Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)), most of these studies use hy-
perbolic discounting (for an excellent review on hyperbolic discount-
ing and time preference see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2002)).
O’DonoghueandRabin(2002)(fromnowonO&R)combinetheBecker
andMurphyapproach withhyperbolicdiscounting2 in theirmodelingof
1This approach to model self-control problems derives from the pioneering work
byStrotz (1956)who notedthatwhen usinga non-exponentionaldiscountfunctionin-
tertemporal utility gives rise to time inconsistency in the sense that an optimal plan at
some particular date may no longer be optimal at further dates. However, self-control
problems may also be modeled while maintaining time consistency (i.e. exponential
discounting). For instance, Laibson (2001) and Bernheim and Rangel (2003) model
self-control problems by introducing cue-conditioned behavior. In their models, en-
vironmental cues may trigger a “hot” mode in which the individual consumes the
addictive substance disregarding its future consequences (i.e. she “looses control”).
2The speciﬁc discounting functional form they use (which we formally present in
SectionI)isnotreallyhyperbolicbutit capturestheessenceofhyperbolicdiscounting,
namely, present-biased preferences. It was ﬁrst introduced by Phelps and Pollack
(1968) and because of its simplicity and tractability, it has been widely used to model
self-control problems since the work of Laibson (1994).58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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addiction. In their framework, an inﬁnitely lived individual3 has to de-
cide at each period whether to consume or not a free addictive product;
i.e. a product presenting the habit-forming and negative internalities
features. As in the Becker-Murphy model, the individual is perfectly
awareofthesetwofeatures. But duetothetimeinconsistentpreferences
embodied in hyperbolic discounting the individual may not be able to
follow his optimal consumption path thus giving rise to self-control
problems. Concerning the awareness of these problems, they distin-
guish two extreme types of individuals: naifs, who are totally unaware;
and sophisticates, who are perfectly aware. A naif believes that his fu-
ture selves will follow his optimal consumption path thus choosing his
current action accordingly. But because of his time inconsistent prefer-
ences, his future selves will often revise the optimal plan hence yielding
a different path from the one intended. As a consequence, a na¨ ıf usu-
ally falls in over-consumption (note that this result captures Heyman’s
description “addicts take more drug that they initially intended”). A so-
phisticate knows that the optimal consumption path he is aiming at may
be revised by his future selves and thus may not be followed. There-
fore he chooses his current action according to the best path that can
be pursued by his future selves. In a sense, a sophisticate is playing
an intrapersonal game: he plays against his future selves. The solution
concept they propose is that of perception-perfect strategy equilibrium4
(from now on we will refer to it as the ORE). However, the ORE has
the shortcoming of producing a counterintuitive result: under some cir-
cumstances, sophisticates will consume always (i.e. become addicted)
while naifs might not. As they point out, this “contradicts the common
intuition that harmful addictions are caused by people naively slipping
into an unplanned addiction”. Following O&R we will refer to those
circumstances as the inevitability condition (IC from now on).
3They also treat the case of an individualwith ﬁnite horizon but mainly as a means
to understand the inﬁnite horizon case. Indeed, in the context of addiction, an inﬁnite
horizon seems a much better approximation of real behavior.
4In the induced game with a ﬁnite horizon T, there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium; call it T-equilibrium. In the inﬁnite horizon case, a perception-perfect
strategy equilibrium is simply the limit of the sequence of T-equilibria as T becomes
long.6 6 6 6 6
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In the present paper we show ﬁrst that this counterintuitive result is
obtained by their particular equilibrium selection (ORE) and that there
are more “natural” dominating equilibria where the paradox vanishes;
i.e. where sophisticates are less prone to become addicted than naifs.
Since in an intrapersonal game the players are just incarnations of the
same individual, coordination on a dominated equilibrium cannot be
supported and therefore we argue that the ORE is not the appropriate
selection. Secondly, we address the issue of developing an addiction,
that is, we analyze the circumstances under which an unaddicted person
coulddecideto startconsumingandwhethershecouldbecomeaddicted
or not. In particular, we show that the ORE solution is of no use for
studying this issue since it implies that both naifs and sophisticates will
slip into addiction. In contrast, by considering our results, naifs will
become addicted while sophisticates will not which is in accordance to
the common intuition cited above. Finally, we suggest a very clear-cut
way of modeling partial awareness of self-control problems.
The importance of our ﬁndings can be motivated in terms of policy im-
plications. Consider for example a public advertising campaign pro-
viding information on self-control problems induced by drug consump-
tion. What such a campaign would normally do is a shift from naive-
ness to sophistication given that people become aware of their time-
inconsistency. Under our results such a campaign would be success-
ful in reducing addiction (since sophisticates are less prone to become
addicted than naifs) while under the O&R result it would produce the
opposite effect. Wide existence of such campaigns favors our results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sections I and II we formally present
the O&R model and their results, stating clearly under which circum-
stances the paradox is obtained. In Section III we study equilibria in
cutoff strategies by providing a complete characterization: in particu-
lar, we state conditions under which the ORE generates the paradox
and yet there is a dominating cutoff equilibrium that solves it. But cut-
off equilibria may not exist or may not solve the paradox, therefore, in
Section IV, we provide non-cutoff dominating equilibria which solve it
whenever generated. In Section V we address the issue of developing
an addiction and argue that the ORE solution fails to explain this issue58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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while our results prove to be in accordance to the common intuition.
Section VI concludes and suggests a “natural” way of modeling partial
awareness of self-control problems, a topic that so far has received very
little attention in the literature.
The O&R Model
In the O&R model, an individual decides at each period t, whether to
consume (hit) or not (refrain) a free addictive product. Let at be the bi-
nary variable reﬂecting the individual’s choice at time t: at =1mean-
ing he decides to hit whereas at =0means he decides to refrain.
His period-t instantaneous utility is given by
∀t,u(kt,a t)=
 




where kt is the individual’s level of addiction which captures all the
effects of past consumption on current instantaneous utility. The level
of addiction is assumed to evolve according to kt+1 = γkt + at with
0 <γ<1. Therefore, there is a maximal addiction level kmax = 1
1−γ .
Note that instantaneous utility is stationary in the sense that it depends
on the prevailing level of addiction at period t but not on the particular
period t. Addiction is modeled by making the following assumptions
on f,g and x :
Assumption 1: f ,g  < 0. This assumption introduces
the feature of negative internalities since the more a per-
son has consumed in the past (as captured by his addiction
level) the lower his current instantaneous utility. Without
loss of generality, it is assumed f (0) = g (0) = 0.
Assumption 2: f  − g  > 0. This assumption intro-
duces the habit-forming feature. To see this, let h(k)=
x + f(k) − g(k) be the temptation to hit (i.e. the marginal
instantaneous utility of hitting). Then h  (k) > 0 implies
that hitting is more desirable the higher the level of addic-
tion; i.e. past consumption of the product (as captured by
I.8 8 8 8 8
Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal Game
Rafael López
the addiction level) increases current desire for consump-
tion.
Assumption 3: f  ,g   ≥ 0. In addition to negative in-
ternalities and habit-forming, it is assumed that the more
addicted a person becomes the less a given increase in k
hurts his instantaneous utility, and therefore less harm hit-
ting induces in future utility.
Assumption 4: x>0. This assumption says that the
temptation to hit is positive even for an unaddicted person.
Self-control problems are modeled by assuming present-biased prefer-
ences as in the Phelps and Pollak intertemporal utility function given
by:




τ−tuτ with β ∈ (0,1)
where each uτ is the period-τ instantaneous utility given by (1) and
where the parameter β introduces the present bias. O&R consider both
general cases: when the individual faces a ﬁnite horizon (T<∞)a n d
an inﬁnite horizon (T = ∞). We will consider only the inﬁnite horizon
version because we believe that it is more realistic: assuming a ﬁnite
horizon would imply that the individual knows in advance the last pe-
riod of his life. As it is standard in Game Theory, the use of an inﬁnite
horizon in a dynamic or repeated game constitutes a better approxima-
tion to a realm where the “last period” is unknown. Moreover, in this
setting the parameter δ may be interpreted as the probability of surviv-
ing one period. Therefore, the intertemporal utility function we will use
takes the form:




τ−tuτ with β ∈ (0,1) (2)
Before stressing out the implications of (2) it is useful to consider the
case of a typical intertemporal utility function with exponential dis-
counting, i.e. (2) with β =1 . FollowingO&R we will refer to a rational
forward-looking person having such preferences as a time consistent in-
dividual (TC).58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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Time Consistent Individuals (TC)
A TC’s preferences are given by





Deﬁnition 1 A behavior path A =( a1,a 2,...) is an inﬁnite sequence of
admissible actions; i.e. ∀i,ai ∈{ 0,1}.
Three particular behavior paths are of special interest and we will la-
bel them as follows: the hitting path H =( 1 ,1,...); the refraining path
R =( 0 ,0,...); and the hitting once path O =( 1 ,0,0,...) .L e tUA
tc (kt)
denote the intertemporal utility given in (3) associated to following the
behavior path A from an initial addiction level kt (the stationary instan-
taneous utility function implies that the unique payoff relevant variable
at any date t is the prevailing addiction level). Being rational forward-





tc (kt)( 4 )
and then chooses the ﬁrst action corresponding to the solutionpath . We
will refer to such a solution as a desired behavior path (DBP). For a TC
there is time consistency: for any starting addiction level kt aD B Pa t
some date t is still optimal at any further date. Therefore a TC has no
self-control problems since future selves have no incentives to deviate
from a DBP chosen by a previous self.
O&R show that under stationary instantaneous utility there exists a crit-
ical addiction level ktc such that each self solves (4) by choosing to hit
if and only if kt ≥ ktc. As a consequence, a TC’s DBP is either hitting
always or refraining always. We state this result as a proposition:
Proposition 2 ∃ktc ∈ [0,k max]suchthattheDBPforaTCwithstarting
addiction level k is H if k ≥ ktcand R otherwise.
We turn now to study the consequences of the preferences given by (2).
A.10 10 10 10 10
Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal Game
Rafael López
Individuals with Time Inconsistent Preferences (TI): Naifs
and Sophisticates
LetUA (kt)betheintertemporalutilitygivenin(2)associatedto follow-
ing the behavior path A from an initial addiction level kt . A rational




A (kt)( 5 )
However, in this case there is time-inconsistency: a DBP (a behavior
path solving (5)) at date t may no longer be optimal at a further date,
in the sense that future selves may have incentives to deviate from it
thus giving rise to self-control problems. O&R distinguish two types
of individuals with preferences induced by (2): Naifs, who are totally
unaware of their time-inconsistency; and Sophisticates who are fully
aware of their time-inconsistency. A Naif believes that he has no self
control problems, that is, he believes that any optimal plan he chooses
will be followed by his future selves. Thus, at any given period, a naif
simply chooses his current action according to the path solving (5), but
the chosen path may be systematically revised at further periods. A
Sophisticate is perfectly aware of his self-control problems, he knows
that the path he is aiming at may be revised by his future selves and
thus may not be followed. Therefore the best he can do is to maximize
(5) subject to the condition that the chosen path will be followed by
his future selves. A sophisticate is thus playing an intrapersonal game
where his opponents are his future selves.
We turn now to study the DBP for a TI. First notice that a TI would like
to behave like a TC from next period on . Therefore, given Proposition
2, a TI’s DBP (i.e. a path A solving (5)) must involve either hitting
always or refraining always from next period on.
This leaves us with only four possibilities for the DBP, namely H,R,O
or (0,1,1,...). However we can discard the last one. The intuition
is simple: if the individual knows that he will become addicted from
tomorrow on, there is no sense in refraining today. The formal proof is
given in the following Lemma.
B.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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Lemma 3 A =( 0 ,1,1,...) cannot be the DBP for a TI.
Proof. Suppose ∃k such that A is the respective DBP. Then it must be
true that k>γ k≥ ktc and therefore UH
tc (k) >U A




























where the last inequality follows from UH
tc (γk+1 )− UH










Lemma 3 implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For any given startingaddiction level k,t h eD B Po faT I
admits only one of the following possibilities (we assume he hits when
indifferent): H, R or O.
Proposition 5 Let A be any behavior path. Then








Part 1 follows directly from negative internalities while part 2 obtains
mainly from the habit-forming assumption (it also requires convexity
of f and g or at least them being not too much concave). Note that, in






∂k . The formal proofs
are given in the appendix.
FollowingO&R, we will deﬁne now three importantlevelsof addiction:
• kHR: addiction level such that always hitting is preferred to al-
ways refrain if and only if k ≥ kHR. Formally, let   k be the solu-
tion to UH (k)=UR (k),t h e nkHR =m a x
 
0,   k
 
follows from
Proposition 5, part 2.12 12 12 12 12
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• kOR: addiction level such that hitting once is preferred to always
refrain if and only if k ≥ kOR. Formally, let   k be the solution to
UO (k)=UR (k),t h e nkOR =m a x
 
0,   k
 
follows from Propo-
sition 5, part 2.
• kHO: addiction level such that hitting always is preferred to hit-
ting once if and only if k ≥ kHO. Formally, let   k be the solution
to UH (k)=UO (k),t h e nkHO =m a x
 
0,   k
 
follows from
Proposition 5, part 2
Remember that the law of motion of k implies a maximum addiction
level kmax = 1
1−γ . According to the formal deﬁnitions of kHR,k OR and
kHO it could be the case that some of them are above kmax. We will
say that kHR,k OR and kHO exist if all of them are below kmax. Because
of Proposition 5, part 2, existence of kHR,k OR and kHO is equivalent
to requiring UH (kmax) ≥ UO (kmax) ≥ UR (kmax). We will assume
throughout that this condition holds.
As O&R point out, in general, kHR and kOR are not rankable so we will
usually distinguish two cases as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: kHR and kOR are not rankable58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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From Propositions 4 and 5 we directly obtain the characterization for a
TI’s DBP:
Proposition 6 aT I ’ sD B Pi s
1. R;f o ra n yk<min
 
kHR,k OR 
2. H;f o ra n yk ≥ max
 
kHR,k HO 
3. O;f o ra n yk ∈
 
kOR,k HO 
We close this section by distinguishing the role played by addiction
and present-biased preferences in Figure 1 and Proposition 6: while
addiction determines the decreasing intertemporal utility functions and
their relative slopes (as depicted in both cases of Figure 1), present-
biased preferences inducethepossibilityof pathO being theDBP (Case
2 in Figure 1, Point 3 in Proposition 6).
The O&R Results
In the previous section we established the DBP for both TC and TI in-
dividuals. We are interested now in determining the realized behavior
path (RBP), that is, the path actually followed for each type of indi-
viduals. This amounts to specifying the actions to be undertaken by
an individual in any particular situation. Because of the stationarity of
utility functions and the inﬁnite horizon it seems natural to make those
actions time-independent: at a particular date, the action of an individ-
ual should depend only on the prevailing addiction level since this is
the only payoff relevant variable; the calendar time is irrelevant. Since
both a TC (correctly) and a Naif (wrongly) believe that they are able
to follow their respective DBP, O&R show that they implement cutoff
actions. We state their results in the following propositions.
Proposition 7 Let αtc (k) be the action taken by a TC when his addic-
tion level is k. Then, ∃ktc ∈ [0,k max] such that αtc (k)=1⇐⇒ k ≥
ktc. Therefore, the RBP of a TC is either H or R.
II.14 14 14 14 14
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Proposition 8 Let αn (k) be the action taken by a Naif when his addic-




Therefore, the RBP of a Naif is either H or R.
Proposition 7 comes directly from Proposition 2. Proposition 8 comes
from the fact that a naif, believing that he is going to be able to follow
his DBP, will decide to hit if and only if his DBP is either H or O.B u t
this happens if and only if k ≥ min
 
kHR,k OR 
= kn. O&R also show
that kn ≤ ktc, an intuitive result since a naif discounts the future at a
higher rate than a TC and therefore the future harm of hitting is lower
for a naif than for a TC.
Let’sturnnowtothesophisticatecase. Becauseofhisawarenessofself-
control problems, a sophisticate is involved in strategic considerations.
The natural solution concept to be called upon for the sophisticate’s in-
trapersonal game is that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Among
the multiple MPE for the inﬁnite horizon case, O&R only consider the
one corresponding to the limit of the unique ﬁnite-horizon MPE as the
horizon becomes long. From now on we will refer to this equilibrium
as the ORE. The RBP generated by this particular equilibrium selection
depends heavily on whether the following condition is satisﬁed or not.
ORE and the Inevitability Condition (IC)
We say that IC holds if and only if UH (0) ≥ U(0,1,1,...)(0), i.e. when-
ever an unaddicted individual prefers hitting always to refraining today
and hitting thereafter. As we will see later on, this condition implies
that in the ORE the individual will decide to hit always, hence the idea
of addiction being inevitable. Let αs (t,k) denote the strategy played
by a sophisticated self-t in the ORE. Notice that we are allowing for the
strategy to depend on the particular period t. This is so because with a
ﬁnite horizon the strategy usually depends on the prevailing period and
nothing ensures us that when taking the limit as the horizon becomes
long we obtain a time-independent strategy. O&R completely charac-
terize the ORE when IC holds and partially when it is not satisﬁed. We
state their results in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Partial Characterization of the ORE.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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1. If IC holds then ∀t,k,αs (t,k)=1; i.e. the sophisticate’s RBP
in the ORE is H.
2. If IC is not satisﬁed then
(a) If γkOR+1 ≥ kHRthen αs (t,k)=1ifand onlyif k ≥ kHR




0 if k<k OR
? if kOR ≤ k<k HR
1 if k ≥ kHR
Two striking features of the ORE are to be mentioned. Concerning
part 1 notice that when IC holds a sophisticate is more prone to be-
come addicted than a naif since a sophisticate will always hit while a




). As O&R point out, this “contradicts the com-
mon intuition that harmful addictions are caused by people naively slip-
pinginto an unplannedaddiction”. However,we claimthat thiscounter-
intuitive result is obtained by the particular equilibrium selection pro-
posed by O&R (i.e. the ORE) and that it vanishes when considering
other type of MPE. Moreover, we claim that there are more “natural”
MPE where a sophisticate, even under IC, will never be more prone
than a naif to develop an addiction. We will address this issue in the
following sections.
Concerning part 2, notice that the counterintuitiveresult vanishes: a so-
phisticate will never be more prone than a naif to develop an addiction.
However, the ORE is left uncharacterized for k ∈
 
kOR,k HR 
.T h i s
characterization is a very complicated task: as O&R point out, for this
case “sophisticates’behaviorcan bequitecomplicated...Infact, because
of these complications sophisticates need not follow a stationary strat-
egy or a cutoff strategy”. However, we will provide conditions under
which a cutoff strategy is a MPE. We also construct non-cutoff equilib-
ria that seem very natural (even under IC).
Since IC plays such an important role in the O&R results, we close this
section by proving part 1 of Proposition 9 which in fact is an immediate
consequence of the following Lemma whose proof is provided in the
appendix.16 16 16 16 16
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Lemma 10 ICimplies∀k,UH (k) ≥ U(0,1,1,...,1)(k)forH and
(0,1,1,...,1) paths of arbitrary length T .
To see that Lemma 10 implies ∀t,k,αs (t,k)=1 , consider a ﬁnite
horizon T.I n p e r i o d T a sophisticated will hit independently of his
addiction level because the instantaneous utility from hitting is always
bigger than the one from refraining and there are obviously no future
costs of hitting. Self- T−1, knowing that self-T will hit no matter
what he does, only has to choose between paths (1,1) and (0,1).B u t
Lemma 10 says that (1,1) is preferred for any prevailing addiction level
at period T−1 and therefore self- T−1 will hit independently of his
addiction level. Proceeding by backward induction we obtain that a
sophisticate will hit in every period. Since this holds for an arbitrarily
path length T, in the limit we obtain that a sophisticate will always hit;
i.e. ORE generates path H.
Since the ORE solution proves to be unsatisfactory, we turn now to
study other sort of MPE. Because TCs and naifs follow cutoff actions,
we begin by studying MPE in cutoff strategies for sophisticates.
MPE in Cutoff Strategies (CE)
In this section we will characterize CE, i.e. MPE where all selves play




1 if k ≥ k
Lemma 11 for k =0 , α(k) is a CE if and only if IC holds.
Proof. Suppose α(k) is a CE and consider an unaddicted self devi-
a t i n gt os o m es t r a t e g yp r e s c r i b i n gα(0) = 0. The path generated by
deviating is (0,1,1,...) while the path generated by sticking is H.F o r
the deviation to be non-proﬁtable we need UH (0) ≥ U011... (0),i . e .I C
must hold. Now suppose IC holds. Then UH (0) ≥ U011... (0) which
implies ∀k,UH (k) ≥ U011... (k) and therefore no deviation from α(k)
is proﬁtable.
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Lemma 12 if kHR ≤ kOR, α(k) with k = kHR is a CE and it domi-
nates any other equilibrium.
Proof. First note that ∀k<k HR the DBP is R whereas ∀k ≥ kHRthe
DBP is H. Therefore, by sticking to strategy α(k) each self follows his
DBP which proves that it is a dominating equilibrium.
Remark 13 Sincein anintrapersonalgametheplayersaredifferentin-
carnations of the same individual, we believe that equilibrium selection
should be resolved, whenever possible, by a Pareto criterion. If there is
not a Pareto dominant equilibrium, at least it should be obvious that a
dominated equilibrium should not be played. In the case kHR ≤ kOR,
α(k) with k = kHRpareto-dominatesany other equilibriumso it would
be quite unnaturalto propose any other solution to this game. However,
when IC holds, the O&R solution yields the hitting path : They argue
that this is sustainable if each self has the pessimistic beliefs that his
future selves will hit no matter what his current action is, thus choosing
to hit since the path H yields a higher utility than (0,1,1,...).B u tw h y
should every self have those pessimistic beliefs when they can coordi-
nate on a dominating equilibrium? We believe this is a major drawback
of the ORE.
In a sense, Lemma 12 says that whenever kHR ≤ kOR there are no self-
control problems since for any addiction level the DBP for a particular
selfwill befollowedby his futures selves. As aconsequence, awareness
of time-inconsistency is immaterial: the paths followed by a naif and a
sophisticate are the same since the solution to (5) at any period and for
any addiction level is still optimal at further periods.
We will now characterize CE when kHR >k OR (notice that this implies
kHR > 0). In what follows we will assume that every self is playing the
same cutoff strategy α. We will denote by V (α(k)) the utility obtained
by a self with addiction level k when sticking to α, whereas V (α(k))
will denote his utility when deviating to a particular strategy α while all
other selves stick to α. Throughout we will assume k>0 since the case
k =0has already been covered in Lemma 11.
Claim 14 If α is a CE then k = kHR.18 18 18 18 18
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Proof. Supposek>k HRandconsideranaddictionlevelk ∈
 
kHR,k OR 
.A n y s t r a t e g yα prescribing α(k)=1is a proﬁtable deviation since
V (α(k)) = UR (k) ≤ UH (k)=V (α(k)). Now suppose k<k HR
and consider an addiction level k such that γk < k<k<k HR (such
a k exists since k>0). Any strategy α prescribing α(k)=0is a
proﬁtable deviation since V (α(k)) = UH (k) ≤ UR (k)=V (α(k)).
Lemma 15 If kHR >k OR,s t r a t e g yα(k) with k = kHR is a CE if and
only if γkOR +1≥ kHR.
Proof. Take any k ≥ kHR and consider deviating to a strategy α pre-
scribing α(k)=0 . The path generated by this deviation is either R
or (0,1,1,...).I f R is generated, the deviation is non proﬁtable since
V (α(k)) = UR (k) ≤ UH (k)=V (α(k)) . Now consider (0,1,1,...)
being generated. In the appendix we prove that U(0,1,1,...) (k) ≤ UH (k)
foranyk ≥kOR. SincethisisthecasewehaveV (α(k)) = U(0,1,1,...) (k)
≤ UH (k)=V (α(k))and therefore the deviation is non-proﬁtable.
For any k<k OR there is no proﬁtable deviation since sticking to




γkOR +1≥ kHR, a deviation to any strategy α prescribing α(k)=1
generates path H thus being non proﬁtable since V (α(k)) = UH (k) ≤
UR (k)=V (α(k)). This proves γkOR +1≥ kHR implies α is a CE.




γk +1 <k HR and consider a deviation to a strategy α prescribing
α(k)=1 . The deviation is proﬁtable since it generates path O and
V (α(k)) = UO (k) >U R (k)=V (α(k)).
Remark 16 Suppose IC does not hold and γkOR +1<k HR. Under




need not follow a cutoff strategy” . Here we go further since Lemma
11 and Lemma 15 imply that under these circumstances sophisticates
cannot follow a cutoff strategy because there is no CE. Also notice that
if IC holds and γkOR +1≥ kHR >k OR there are exactly two CE : the
one with k =0and the one with k = kHR. The latter clearly dominates
the former so one would expect the different selves to coordinate in the
second equilibrium while O&R take as solution to the game the ﬁrst
one.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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We summarize our results concerning CE in the following Proposition.
Proposition 17 Characterization of CE and comparison with ORE.
1. If IC holds then
(a) If γkOR +1≥ kHR then α(k) with k = kHR and ORE are
the only CE. α(k)dominates ORE.
(b) If γkOR +1<k HRthen ORE is the unique CE.
2. If IC does not hold then
(a) If γkOR +1≥ kHR then α(k) with k = kHR is the unique
CE. α(k) and ORE coincide.
(b) If γkOR +1<k HRthen there exists no CE.
If we are to restrict our attention to CE, the case γkOR +1<k HRis
a problematic one. If IC holds then we have the ORE solution which
provedtobecounterintuitivesincesophisticationcouldexacerbateover-
consumption. If IC doesn’t hold then we may have non-existence of
CE. This leads us to study non-cutoff equilibria which is done in the
following section.
Non-cutoff Equilibria: some examples
In what follows, we still restrict ourselves to MPE where the strategies
involved are time-independent. We also focus on the case γkOR +1<
kHR since the opposite has already been covered.
IC holds: “I won’t hit because if I do it I will do it forever”
Here we go one step further in resolving IC since we provide a MPE
that dominates ORE whenever IC holds.
Lemma 18 strategy   α(k)=
 




A.20 20 20 20 20
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Proof. For k =0 , sticking to   α generates path R while deviating gen-
erates path H.S i n c e0 ≤ kOR <k RH the deviation is non proﬁtable.
For any k>0 a deviation is neither proﬁtable since it generates path
(0,1,1,...) which is clearly dominated by H (Lemma 10).
Remark 19   α dominatesthe ORE though it does it strictlyonlyfor k =
0: when sticking to   α an unaddicted sophisticate will never develop an
addiction, moreover any self is strictly better-off by sticking to   α since it
generates his DBP. However,   α has the shortcoming of being non robust
or fragile, since any small deviation by any self develops the addiction.
Nevertheless, we claim that this equilibrium deserves attention since
it captures strategic decisions often observed in the realm of harmful
addictive drugs: Decisions of the sort “I won’t do it because if I do it I
will do it forever” (think of drugs such as heroin).
“Take a walk on the wild side”
We already know that a CE fails to existif IC is not satisﬁed and is equal
to the ORE otherwise (thus being dominated by naive behavior).
Let k =
kHR−1
γ , so that hitting with any k ≥ k drives the addiction level






0 if k<k OR
1 if kOR ≤ k<k
0 if k ≤ k<k HR
1 if k ≥ kHR
which tries to capture the following idea illustrated in Figure 2:
B.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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Figure 2: The “Take a Walk on the Wild Side” strategy.
There is a wild side ( k ≥ kOR) in which hitting is an effective temp-
tation (for k<k ORhitting is not effectively tempting because always
refrain is the DBP) and therefore the individual would like to hit (take
a walk). In this wild side there is a zone of no-return (k ≥ kHR )s i n c e
once an individual falls in it he becomes irremediably addicted (he hits
forever after). Now notice that hitting leads to the zone of no-return if
and only if k ≥ k, therefore k marks the point where a no-trespassing
zone (k<k<k HR ) begins. With strategy αwws the individual hits
whenever on the wild side and outside the no-trespassing zone, i.e. he
takes a walk but knows when to stop.
Unfortunately,αwws does not always constitutean equilibrium. A coun-
terexample is given in the appendix (Example A, Section VIII) . How-
ever, we will provide some conditions under which αwws happens to be
aM P E .





a MPE. (This Lemma is illustrated in Figure 3. In the appendix we
provide examples satisfying the condition stated with the IC holding,
Example B, Section VIII, and not holding, Example C, Section VIII)
Proof. For any addiction level k such that k<k OR or k ≥ kHR,
αwws generates the respective DBP so there is no proﬁtable deviation.
For any k such that kOR ≤ k<k HR, by sticking to αwws the DBP is
generated (and thus there is no proﬁtable deviation). To see this ﬁrst
notice that the DBP is hitting once. Following αwws the individual hits22 22 22 22 22
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and then drives the addiction level above k but below kHR, therefore his
immediate future self will refrain and, since by doing so he drives the
addiction level below kOR, all other future selves will refrain as well.
For any k such that k ≤ k<k HR, αwws generates path R, while any
deviation generates path H.S i n c eR is preferred to H we conclude that
there is no proﬁtable deviation.
We tackle now the case kHR ≤ k<k HO. First notice that necessarily
kHO =
ktc−1
γ .L e tk0 = kHO,d e ﬁ n ek1 =
k0−1
γ and suppose the current




. Clearly, by sticking to
αwws hitting with addiction level k generates path H . A deviation, i.e.
refraining with addiction level k, drives next-period’s addiction level
below γk0 = ktc − 1 <k tc so from the current self’s perspective the
best possible behavior path following restraint is R (because he would
like to behave like a TC from next period on and a TC would like to
refrain always for addiction levels below ktc). That is, the best possible
behavior path that could be generated by a deviation is R.S i n c e f o r
addiction level k, H is preferred to R we conclude that there is no prof-
itable deviation. But proceeding by induction, the same logic applies






γ (i =0 ,1,...) so
we ﬁnally conclude that there is no proﬁtable deviation for any k such
that kHR ≤ k ≤ kHO.








R>O>H O>R>H O>H>R H>O>R
Stick
DBP












In the first row we rank the paths R,H and O. In the second row weput the actions prescribed
the fourth establisheswhether this path is the desired behavior path (DBP), the best possiblepath
(BPP) or none. The fifth row establishes the path generated bydeviating from the strategy
proposed in the second row. Finally, thesixth row establishes whether there is no profitable
deviation (NPD).
by the strategy. The third row establishesthe path generated by sticking to the strategy and58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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Remark 21 If IC does not hold (Example C, Section VIII) we know
that there is no cutoff equilibrium, αwws proves existence of a non-
cutoff MPE. If IC holds (Example B, Section VIII), we know that the
unique cutoff equilibrium is hitting always, then αwws constitutes an
equilibrium that clearly dominates it, moreover, αwws also dominates
the fragile equilibrium   αgiven in Lemma 18.
Developing an Addiction: kHR >k OR =0
O&R state (page 4) “While Becker and Murphy (1988) argue it can
be optimal for a person to maintain a severely harmful addiction, their
steady-statemodelprovidesno formalanalysisofwhythepersonwould
choose to develop this harmful addiction in the ﬁrst place.” If we are to
study why a person could choose to develop an addiction the pertinent
starting addiction level must be k =0 ;i.e. we must focus on the behav-
ior of an unaddicted person. Suppose kOR > 0.I fkHR ≥ kOR we are
in a situation as the one depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: kHR ≥ kOR
In this case the DBP for an unaddicted person is clearly R, and there-
fore the addiction will never be developed since the addictive product
is not “tempting”: no incarnation wants to consume it. If kHR <k OR
V.24 24 24 24 24
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we should distinguish two cases; kHR > 0 and kHR =0 ; which are
illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: When kHR <k OR we distinguish two cases; kHR > 0 and
kHR =0
In Case 1 we also obtain the non-tempting condition that ensures that
the addiction will never be developed. In Case 2, the DBP for an unad-
dicted person is H and the addiction is developed (every self will decide
to hit). However, in this case there are no self-control problems: each
self is following his DBP which amounts to saying that the person is a
“happy addict” in the sense that each incarnation behaves precisely as
the previous selves desired; each self wants to consume and wants his
future selves to consume as well. Therefore, the interesting case (the
one presenting self-control problems) for studying the development of
an addiction must involve kHR >k OR =0as depicted in Figure 6. (the
case kHR = kOR =0is similar to Case 2).58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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Figure 6: kHR >k OR =0
In this case the unaddicted person would like to hit just once (his DBP
is O). If the person is a Naif, he will clearly develop the addiction. We
turn now to study a sophisticate’s behavior.
First notice that IC holds which implies that in the ORE a sophisticate
will also develop an addiction. Are there other equilibria in which a
sophisticate does not develop an addiction? The answer is yes since the
strategy“Iwon’t hitbecause ifIdoit Iwilldo itforever”providedin the
previous section is clearly a MPE that induces the refraining path and
therefore dominates the ORE. The following Lemma shows an equilib-
rium that dominates the ORE and generates the hitting once path.





1 if k =0
0 if k = γi for some i ∈{ 0,1,2,...}
1 if otherwise
This strategy is a MPE that generates path O.
Proof. When k =0 , sticking to α(k) generates path O which is the
DBP, therefore there is no proﬁtable deviation. For any k = γi with
i ∈{ 0,1,2,...}, sticking to α(k) generates path R.N o w ﬁ x i and
notice that γ (γi)+1>γ j for any j ∈{ 0,1,2,...}, therefore deviating26 26 26 26 26
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from α(k) generates path H which is non-proﬁtable. For any other k
sticking to α(k) generates path H (because for any j ∈{ 0,1,2,...},
γk +1 >γ j) while deviating generates path (0,1,1,...) (because if
k  = γi for all i ∈{ 0,1,2,...},t h e nγk  = γj for all j ∈{ 0,1,2,...})
which is non-proﬁtable since IC holds.
This equilibrium dominates the ORE, but compared to the strategy “I
won’thitbecauseifIdoitIwilldoitforever”theinitialself(unaddicted
person) is strictly better-off while any future self is strictly worse-off.
Discussion
The O&R set-up seems appropriate for modeling addiction since it in-
corporates thetwo basic features of an addictive substance (habit-formation
and negative internalities) and it allows for self-control problems which
have been largely documented in the psychological literature. This is an
improvement with respect to the Becker-Murphy model of rational ad-
diction in which self-control problems were inexistent. However, their
particular equilibrium selection (ORE) for the intrapersonal game in-
duced by sophisticated behavior has the shortcoming of producing a
counterintuitive result: awareness of self-control problems may exacer-
bate over-consumption.
We have shown that this paradox vanishes when considering other sort
of equilibria that dominate the ORE and that seem more natural since
they capture behaviors often observed in the realm of addiction. Since
in an intrapersonal game the players are incarnations of the same in-
dividual, coordination on a dominated equilibrium is hard to sustain5.
This favors our equilibria over the ORE and therefore we readily obtain
that naifs are more prone to become addicted than sophisticates. The
5Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) obtain a similar conclusion. In their model the con-
sumer is uncertain about the degree of addictiveness of the product but may acquire
freeinformationwhicheventuallyrevealsthe true degree. In the ﬁnite-horizonversion
each self decides to acquire the information, therefore, when considering the equilib-
rium of the inﬁnite horizon case that is the limit of the ﬁnite case equilibrium, each
self decides to get fully informed. But there are other dominating equilibria (refered
to as strategic ignorance equilibria) where the selves decide not to get fully informed.
VI.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
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only cases where the ORE is a dominating equilibrium (and therefore
it is the appropriate solution concept to be called upon) is when the de-
sired behavior path is to consume always or when IC does not hold and
γkOR +1≥ kHR.
Another advantage of the O&R set up over the Becker-Murphy model
is that it permits to explain why an unaddicted person could decide to
consume and develop an addiction. We have seen that for this to be
possible consumption should be tempting (in the sense that the desired
behavior path cannot be refraining) in which case a na¨ ıf will always be-
come addicted. Regarding sophisticate behavior, we proved that when
the DBP is either hit always or hit once then the inevitability condition
must hold and therefore the ORE implies that a sophisticate will also
become addicted. This makes sense only when the DBP is hit always
since in this case there are no self-control problems and thus na¨ ıf and
sophisticate behavior coincide. But when the DBP is hitting once, we
provide equilibria where a sophisticate will not become addicted which
copes with the general view that addiction is the outcome of na¨ ıve be-
havior.
Naiveness and sophistication are extreme degrees of awareness and one
would expect that real-world behaviors lie somewhere in between. We
want to conclude by suggesting a way to model partial awareness. Very
little has been done in this direction: O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001a)
formulate an approach to partial naivete in which a partially na¨ ıf agent
is simply a sophisticate who overestimates his present-biased parame-
ter β. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b) propose an approach to bound-
edly rational incomplete awareness in which agents “don’t do all the
rounds of backwards-induction. In other words, instead of starting the
backwards-induction logic in the last period, they might start the pro-
cess, say, three periods hence.”. We believe that the ﬁrst approach is
somehow ad-hoc while the second is not applicable to the inﬁnite hori-
zon case since it relies on the backwards-induction logic. We suggest
a very natural approach: people are initially na¨ ıf and as time elapses
they become aware of their self-control problems (i.e. they become so-
phisticates). This approach is also suggested by Elster (1999): “reversal
experiences can give rise to learning. Once the person observes himself28 28 28 28 28
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reversing his decisions time and again, he will come to know that this is
just the way he behaves under these circumstances. In the language of
O’Donoghue and Rabin, he is no longer naive, but sophisticated.” Ob-
viously there would be persons that become aware more quickly than
others; to be more precise, we could deﬁne an agent as a t-naif when
it takes him t periods to become aware of his time inconsistency. With
this formulation, naifs and sophisticates are ∞-naifs and 0-naifs respec-
tively. This would allow to observe behaviors which imply hitting for a




1. UA (k) is decreasing. Let kt (A,k) be the addiction level prevail-
ing at time t conditional on following path A with starting addic-
tionlevelk;i . e .k1(A,k)=k; kt (A,k)=γt−1k+
 t−1
i=1 γt−i−1ai
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(3) is positive because of the habit-forming feature (Assumption
2: f  − g  > 0); (4) is positive because γtk +
 t−1
i=0 γi >γ tk +  t
i=1 γt−iai and f
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(9) is positive by the habit-forming feature; (10) is positive be-
cause γtk+
 t
i=1 γt−iai ≥ γtk and g
  

























































combining (7) and (14) completes the proof.
Claim used in Lemma 15
Claim 23 ∃k
 






Proof. If IC holds, we obtain trivially k
  =0≤ kOR.S oa s s u m e
that IC doesn’t hold, that is, UH (0) <U (0,1,1,...)(0).D e ﬁ n e∆(k)=
UH (k) − U(0,1,1,...)(k). Simple calculations yield


















B.58 SEGUNDO SEMESTRE DE 2006, PP . 1-35.
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
31 31 31 31 31





and convexity of f). Since ∆(0) < 0 (because IC doesn’t hold) and
∆(kmax) ≥ 0 such a k
 













































































































































































































where h = f −g. But this is a contradiction because h is increasing and
therefore the RHS of (18) is positive. This completes the proof.32 32 32 32 32
Addiction and Self-Control: An Intrapersonal Game
Rafael López
Appendix - Examples




x − ρkt if
−(ρ + σ)kt if
at =1
at =0
with x,ρ and σ positive, which clearly satisﬁes the conditions given in
Section I.
An example where αwws fails to be an equilibrium










. To see this, consider the following ﬁgure:
In the ﬁrst row we rank the paths R,H and O. In the second row we
put the actions prescribed by the strategy,. The third row establishes
the path generated by sticking to the strategy and the fourth establishes
whether this path is the desired behavior path (DBP), the best possible
path (BPP) or none. The ﬁfth row establishes the path generated by
deviating from the strategy proposed in the second row. Finally, the
sixth row establishes whether there is no proﬁtable deviation (NPD).





. For αwws to





R>O>H O>R>H O>H>R H>O>R
Stick
NPD NPD NPD NPD
DBP DBP BPP DBP
10100... 000... 010... 000... 111...
111...
111... 100...
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occurs only if U(0,1,0,...) 
kHR 
≥ UH  
kHR 
. Parameter values where
this doesn’t hold (and therefore αwws fails to be an equilibrium), are
β =0 .78 δ =0 .9 ρ =4 0 .5 σ =2 0 γ =0 .8 x = 102






β =0 .79 δ =0 .9 ρ =4 0 σ =2 0 γ =0 .8 x = 102






β =0 .9 δ =0 .9 ρ =4 0 σ =2 0 γ =0 .9 x = 101
t−naiveness: an example where the realized behavior path
involves hitting a ﬁnite number of times
Let k0 = kOR and deﬁne ki = γki−1 +1for i =1 ,2,....L e t j =
max
 
i : ki ≤ kHR 
so that j is the maximum number of consecutive
hits, starting from kOR, that keep the addiction level below kHR.L e t
k1 = kHR−1
γ and deﬁne ki =
ki−1−1
γ for i =1 ,2,.... Suppose j is odd
and UR  
k2
 
≥ U1100...  
k2
 





0 if k<k OR
1 if kOR ≤ k<kj
0 if k2n+1 ≤ k<k2n for 2n +1<j
1 if k2n ≤ k<k2n−1 for 2n<j
Starting from kOR, a sophisticate will hit once, a naif will hit forever
and:
A 1-naif will hit once
A 2-naif and a 3-naif will hit 3 times
B.                           
C. 
  D.34 34 34 34 34
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A 4-naif and a 5-naif will hit 5 times
...
A j-1-naif and a j-naif will hit j times
A n-naif for n bigger than j will hit forever.
An example with j =5is given by
β =0 .9 δ =0 .9 ρ =4 3 σ =2 0 γ =0 .9 x = 106
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